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 From ratifi  cation to compliance  : 
  quantitative evidence on the spiral model   
    Beth  A.    Simmons    
          Human rights researchers have discovered quantitative indicators and meth-
ods. As a result, for better or for worse, human rights research has joined the 
mainstream approach to social science research in the past decade. Th  e  sys-
tematic comparison of specifi  c hypotheses, followed by controlled hypothesis 
testing using a range of indicators of rights now easily accessible in carefully 
constructed, well-vetted and widely and freely available datasets is becoming 
an important mode for studying human rights. Th   is has allowed both rights 
advocates as well as rights skeptics to plumb their conceptions of the causes and 
consequences of the international human rights regime. 
 Th   e dedicated eff  orts of scholars, organizations and rights advocates to prod-
uce comparable, consistent and carefully constructed indicators for various 
aspects of human rights realizations has been a boon to research. Used carefully, 
critically and with an appreciation for its inherent limits,    1    quantitative  research 
has the potential to check whether understandings generated from case stud-
ies can be generalized. It can also suggest systematic ways in which our “theor-
ies” might be amended or conditioned.     Th   e purpose of this chapter is to review 
the relatively recent (and mostly quantitative) research in precisely this spirit. 
        My focus is primarily on the arguments advanced over a decade ago in what at 
that time was one of the most carefully executed and theoretically motivated 
explorations of the relationship between international human rights norms and 
actual practices: the “spiral model” developed by Th   omas Risse, Stephen Ropp 
and Kathryn Sikkink in  Th   e Power of Human Rights   (  1999  ; PoHR in the follow-
ing)  .  Th  e  fi  rst section sets out in brief the original elements of PoHR’s theory of 
how international human rights norms have practical eff  ects on human rights 
practices. Th   e second section compares the theoretical assumptions and causal 
claims of the spiral model with the last decade’s cascade of quantitative research. 
PoHR was fairly explicit about the conditions under which they expected human 
rights norms to infl  uence outcomes, and the specifi  c mechanisms through 
which they thought a dynamic of normative change could take place.   
  1      See the discussion of limitations in Simmons ( 2009 ).  
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 Th   e chapter concludes by assessing the extent to which on the whole qualita-
tive and quantitative research fi  ndings are mutually reinforcing. In contrast to 
claims that methodological diff  erences have driven a wedge between research-
ers from varying methodological traditions, I fi  nd that the combination of quali-
tative and quantitative research has greatly improved our parallax on human 
rights. Indeed, there is just as much if not more cacophony   within   the quanti-
tative school and   among   qualitative researchers than there is   across   approaches. 
I also fi  nd that while no one has been able (or motivated) to test quantitatively 
the spiral model in its entirety, a good deal of quantitative research is consistent 
with what we might have expected to observe if the major claims of the model 
do indeed capture certain aspects of reality. However, parts of the original model 
are quite indeterminate and therefore consistent with a broad range of possible 
tests and outcomes. Nonetheless, I argue that the way forward is not to con-
struct unnecessary methodological divisions among social scientists, but rather 
to develop and refi  ne our research using the best tools available and appropriate 
for the research question. For the most part, this means using mixed methods 
and developing partnerships to refi  ne and test theories that are not only innova-
tive, but that explain a lot of what appears at fi  rst to be confusing about the world 
in which we live.      
  Th   e power of empirical research 
    A necessary condition: political liberalization, 
domestic structural reform   
 Th   e spiral model attempts to explain how international human rights norms 
come to infl  uence actual human rights practices domestically. No one – PoHR 
included – has ever proposed a single statistical test of the spiral in its entirety. 
Yet there is a growing body of research that addresses at least parts of the model 
PoHR proposed over a decade ago. Some of the relationships documented in the 
quantitative scholarship are at least partially consistent with PoHR’s theoretical 
expectations. Th   e unique contribution of the model was the series of dynamics 
it proposed. Quantitative research has shed light on a few static relationships, 
capturing one or two “phases” of the model at best. Th   is is hardly surprising, 
since quantitative researchers never set out explicitly to test for the model PoHR 
proposed. 
  PoHR began with one huge caveat: “Stable improvements in human rights 
conditions usually require some measure of political transformation and can 
be regarded as one aspect of [the political] liberalization process” (PoHR: 4). 
Rights cannot be expected to improve much – much less become “habitual” – in 
the absence of broader political liberalization. External norms and even exter-
nal political pressure cannot be expected to sustain signifi  cant rights improve-
ments unless there are fundamental changes in the domestic institutions of 
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accountability and governance. If there is one clear message from the quanti-
tative literature, it is that this basic assumption is largely warranted. Practically 
every regression that has ever been run fi  nds a strong and convincing positive 
correlation between human rights – or more specifi  cally, broadly accepted 
measures of physical integrity and political repression, the rights outcomes 
with which PoHR were primarily concerned – and various measures of polit-
ical liberalization (typically the polity scale, which largely gauges institutions 
of participatory democracy; see Apodaca   2001  ; Landman   2005a  ; Neumayer 
 2005 ;  Poe   et al.     1999  ). Below a certain level, however, small improvements in 
democracy indicators have little to no infl  uence on repressive human rights 
(Buena de Mesquita  et al.   2005 ; Davenport and Armstrong  2004 ).  2   “Show-case” 
democracies tend to experience only brief and reversible improvements in the 
basic human rights of their opponents (Cingranelli and Richards  1999 ). Clearly, 
these are not the regimes for which respect for human rights norms are likely to 
become “habitual.” 
  PoHR also acknowledged the related idea that sustained improvements in 
human rights practices were conditioned by the broader legal and judicial cap-
acities of the country in question: “We argue that the enduring implementa-
tion of human rights norms requires political systems to establish the rule of 
law” (PoHR: 3). Th   e spiral could launch, but would sputter and eventually fail if 
other institutional changes did not take place in which norms could fi  nd domes-
tic traction and eventually enforceability. Quantitative researchers have found 
some evidence for the proposition that countries with more highly developed 
legal institutions, and in particular independent judiciaries, do tend to have bet-
ter civil rights protections, for example guarantees against unreasonable search 
and seizure (Cross   1999  ) and better access to fair trials (Simmons   2009  ). As 
will be discussed below, domestic legal and institutional mechanisms that are 
able independently to check government policies are increasingly proposed and 
tested in the quantitative literature as a mechanism through which international 
human rights norms eventually gain suffi   cient domestic traction to change 
rights practices overall. 
      It is not surprising, given their skepticism for long-term normative “intern-
alization” in the absence of deeper governing and institutional changes, that 
PoHR did not have especially high hopes for international human rights 
norms in the context of the countries in their edited volume. None of the coun-
tries in their volume were stable democracies over the course of the past fi  ft  y 
years. Uganda, Tunisia and Morocco were never governed as democracies by 
  2             Simmons (  2009  ) found a similar result for a related right: the right to a fair trial. 
“Democratization” – or incremental yearly movements on the polity scale – was only associ-
ated with improvements in the provision of a fair trial among the subset of countries that 
were basically already decades-long stable democracies, but not stable autocracies or transi-
tioning regimes (Table 5.3, p. 184)  .  
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traditional standards. South Africa, Kenya, Chile, Guatemala, the Philippines 
and Indonesia can be considered “transitional,” “transitioned” or “partial” dem-
ocracies, but they vary considerably in terms of the strength of their traditions 
of governing by the rule of law, with Chile at the strong end of the spectrum 
(also to a certain extent Morocco) and Guatemala at the weak end.    3    F r o m   t h e  
outset, PoHR considered all of these countries to varying degrees “hard cases” 
and expected international norms to fare diff  erentially across them (PoHR: 2). 
In the end, they professed a degree of “surprise” with the power of human rights 
ideas in some cases (in Chile, Guatemala and Indonesia) but were also dismayed 
in others (Tunisia and Kenya; PoHR: 3). Could these diff  erences be explained by 
broader trends in democratization and judicial and legal reform, or the specifi  c 
mechanisms of the spiral model itself?      
  Phase 1: repression activates transnational civil society groups 
      Non-governmental organizations have been at the heart of understanding how 
and why human rights values became salient internationally in the twentieth cen-
tury. Human rights have been championed by civil society actors, and embraced 
by most governments far more grudgingly. Th   is is the natural consequence of 
the content of these rights; they tend to empower individuals and civil society 
groups vis-  à  -vis their governments. Th   e qualitative literature has been domi-
nated by studies of the importance of civil society groups, non-governmental 
organizations, and transnational advocacy networks in moving the human 
rights agenda forward (Korey   1998  ) and contributing to the “legalization” of 
these norms in international law (Breen  2003 ; Clark  2001 ; Cohen  1990 ; Dezalay 
and Garth   2006  ). NGOs are now said to constitute “external legitimating audi-
ences” that keep the unlimited exercise of state sovereignty to some degree in 
check (Friedman  et al.   2005 ). 
  PoHR made fairly specifi  c claims about the role of NGOs. Th   ey put most of 
their emphasis on the mobilization of  transnational  human rights organizations 
and networks in the   early   stages of the spiral. Th   ey highlighted the informa-
tional as well as the advocacy roles of these groups, with a special focus on their 
linkages with the West (PoHR: 5). External pressure generated and sustained by 
these groups is central in the spiral model to “remind liberal states of their own 
identity,” protect domestic groups by giving external legitimacy to their claims, 
and to keep up the pressure “from above,” crucially supplementing that “from 
below” (PoHR: 5). Transnational human rights networks are therefore hypoth-
esized to be crucial actors in the process of state socialization. 
  Quantitative research has a tough time convincingly distinguishing the 
mechanisms of persuasion, bargaining, incentive manipulation and shaming 
  3          In order to avoid an extended debate and justifi  cation for these categories, I have simply 
used the categorization presented in Simmons ( 2009 : Appendix 2).  
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that have become central to socialization theory. Th  is  refl  ects the broader dif-
fi  culties the diff  usion literature has in distinguishing mechanisms of coercion 
from adaptation from emulation from internalization (Simmons   et al.    2008 ): 
it is hard to infer motives from statistical correlations. One cut at this prob-
lem is simply to use statistical methods to test the proposition that the dens-
ity of NGO networks is at least loosely associated with observable indicators 
that governments might be becoming “socialized.” Global statistical data on the 
nature and strength of these networks is not especially nuanced. Several quan-
titative researchers have used “the number of international NGOs with domes-
tic participation” which they “interpret as a measure of civil society strength” 
to try to capture this argument. While it does not prove the dynamics of the 
spiral model as a whole, most studies fi  nd what PoHR would expect: that there 
is a correlation between local memberships in international non-governmen-
tal organizations and better rights practices, where the dependent variable is 
Freedom House’s measure of civil and political rights or the Political Terror 
Scale (Neumayer  2005 ) or personal integrity rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
 2005 ).  Such  fi  ndings of course do not confi  rm the spiral model   in toto  , but they 
are   roughly   consistent with its expectations.     Since PoHR claims that domestic 
civil society actors are more important   later   in the cycle, the   domestic   member-
ships in INGOs used in the studies above should intensify when denial subsides 
and tactical concessions are on the rise. Few quantitative tests that are sensitive 
to such timing have been done, but according to one study there appear to be 
spikes in local ties to INGOs   aft  er treaty ratifi  cation   (which one might think of 
as either a tactical concession or possibly prescriptive behavior, depending on 
whether one views such moves as strategic or sincere (Simmons   2009  )). Again, 
while these tests were not designed to test PoHR’s spiral, they do suggest a rough 
correspondence with the qualitative story told by their research.      
      Governments make tactical concessions 
 Th   e spiral model is intriguing because in some sense it appears to rest on an 
irrational logic. Governments take what they think will be inconsequential pol-
icy actions that they think may mollify their international and external critics. 
In PoHR’s account, these actions oft  en end up entrapping repressive govern-
ments (PoHR: 16). Th   is is a core point on which PoHR diverges starkly with 
realist accounts of human rights. Many quantitative as well as qualitative schol-
ars simply refuse to accept the PoHR premise – that tactical concessions matter 
to the big picture of human rights politics or practices. What matters is  enforce-
ment   of norms, and this is what they all tend to assume is radically AWOL in 
the area of international human rights. Talking the talk is just that. Walking 
the walk, PoHR’s theoretically opponents believe, requires much more forceful 
action (Downs   et al.     1996  ; Goldsmith and Posner   2005  ; Hafner-Burton   2005  ; 
Krasner  1999 ), in the absence of which governments might even commit worse 
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abuses behind the shield of their concession (Hafner-Burton   2008  ).     Tactical 
concessions such as treaty ratifi  cation have been characterized variously as an 
exercise in “public relations” (Keith   1999  ), “window-dressing” (Hafner-Burton 
and Tsutsui  2005 ), or a (mere) “expressive” gesture (Hathaway  2002 ) that brings 
no consequences in practice. Ultimately, these authors all stress, tactical ratifi  -
cation does not matter to rights practices because treaties are not enforced. “As 
long as enforcement of a human rights treaty remains relatively weak, countries 
with egregious human rights records will join it purely for the symbolic benefi  ts 
that ratifi  cation confer” (Cole  2005 : 492). 
  If PoHR’s rhetorical entrapment argument is correct, it does raise a tough 
question: why can’t repressive governments foresee the communicative quick-
sand they are about to wade into and steer clear of it in the fi  rst place? PoHR 
has three answers. First, governments miscalculate, and they do so   systematic-
ally  : “When they make these minor concessions, states almost uniformly over-
estimate their own support among their population” (PoHR: 27). Somewhat 
mysteriously, governments apparently don’t learn, either over time or from the 
experiences of other governments’ experiences, that minor concessions can lead 
to a real political quagmire. Second, they may be bribed. Th  ird,  governments 
might be in the early throes of socialization. Saying (or better yet, doing) is 
believing. A certain amount of self-persuasion may very well be underway. 
 Miscalculation is a possibility, but it is likely only to obtain under a narrow set 
of circumstances. Not all governments are equally likely to miscalculate. Stable 
governments presiding over stable regimes in particular are likely to be able to 
make good predictions about the likely outcome of their tactical concessions. 
Repressive governments might decide to make a tactical concession to their pol-
itical opposition, and if they encounter hopeful expectations of liberalization 
respond with further repression. Some will be able to forecast quite well their 
ability to “manage expectations,” even if they need to use more repression to do 
so (Vreeland  2008 ). 
  Where conditions are in fl  ux, however, such estimations have much greater 
confi  dence intervals around them. Tactical concessions could lead to “unex-
pected consequences” under conditions of turmoil and change. Th  is  argument 
is consistent with the results of some quantitative research that suggests that the 
ratifi  cation of international treaties (very likely tactical in some cases) tends to 
be most positive and signifi  cantly correlated with improved rights practices in 
neither stable democracies nor stable autocracies (where their consequences are 
relatively predictable) but in countries undergoing various degrees of regime 
transition, where it is much harder for a government to foresee the social and 
political consequences of its actions (Simmons  2009 ). 
  We can also hypothesize that miscalculation is more likely where infor-
mation is very thin, and then test for a relationship between the information 
environment and the tendency to make tactical concessions. States are more 
likely to bend to international pressures when they cannot forecast very well the 
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consequences predicted by the spiral model. Quantitative tests are few, but one 
study found “emulative” treaty ratifi  cation behavior to be strongest where the 
information environment was most thin: in regions of the world where infor-
mation was stifl  ed by government controlled media and earlier in the life of 
the human rights regime, where the record of the consequences of tactical rati-
fi  cation was still sparse (Simmons   2009  ). Th   is could mean that poor informa-
tion accounts for some of the miscalculation associated with cynically adopting 
international norms. 
 But even with poor information, why should we expect governments to “uni-
formly” underestimate the pressure they will face to further liberalize? One pos-
sibility is that forecasts are only relevant in the short run. Some quantitative 
evidence suggests the shorter a repressive government’s time horizon, the more 
likely it is to make a human rights concession; if its discount rate is high enough 
the immediate praise for doing do may simply outweigh the longer term conse-
quences in terms of galvanizing political demands for further rights guarantees 
(Simmons   2009 ).  Th  e short-term benefi  ts may exceed the (high discounted) 
future costs. 
   Th  e second possibility – external bribery – has been the subject of some 
quantitative empirical investigation. It is relatively straightforward to analyze 
whether governments make tactical human rights concessions in response to 
various material or even non-material inducements off  ered by outsiders. Th  e 
most straightforward case can be made for aid: it is relatively easy for donor gov-
ernments to manipulate aid to reward concessions they believe to be important. 
But quantitative research does not unambiguously support the proposition that 
aid responds to human rights policies – tactical or genuine.     A study of the UK 
aid policies found that aid responded to human rights if at all when important 
foreign or economic policy interests were not at stake (Barratt   2004  )    .     Studies of 
European aid conclude that despite attention to “soft   power” the human rights 
situation in developing countries does not consistently shape European aid 
commitments  (Carey   2007 )  .    Th   e United States’ aid policy has also been con-
strained by broader foreign policy concerns. During the Cold War, aid went to 
repressive and non-repressive governments alike, although in the 1990s mili-
tary aid did tend to fl  ow less readily to the more repressive regimes (Blanton 
 2005 ).  Th   e United States seems somewhat more willing to use aid to encourage 
rights improvements when they have a signifi  cant potential to impact the United 
States, as in the area of human traffi   cking (Chuang   2005–2006  ), but otherwise 
the response of US aid to rights concessions of any kind is weak. It is hard to see 
how aid might be used in a targeted way to encourage human rights conces-
sions, especially ones that are merely tactical.   
 Th   e responsiveness of multilateral aid to human rights policies is similarly 
inconclusive. On the one hand, some studies have concluded that countries that 
receive loans from the World Bank are likely to have better workers’ rights than 
those who do not (Abouharb and Cingranelli   2004  ), which appears consistent 
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with the use of aid as a reward for human rights practices. On the other hand, 
other studies have emphasized that the austerity implied by multilateral loan 
conditions actually makes the realization of a range of rights less likely (Fields 
  2003  ; Franklin   1997  ). If this is the case, it is not very likely that these organi-
zations care enough about tactical concessions to target their aid contingent 
upon it. More likely, they are simply not paying attention.     If the rights abuse is 
signifi  cant enough to be investigated and censured by the UN Human Rights 
Commission, multilateral lenders may take more note (Lebovic and Voeten 
 2009 )  .  But  this  fi  nding does not support the claim that   tactical concessions   are 
bought and paid for through international foreign aid. (I return to this point 
when discussing the role of external pressure in encouraging   real   human rights 
improvements, below). 
   Even more strained are arguments (and evidence) that tactical concessions are 
made to attract trade or investment. Such arguments have a series of high hurdles 
to overcome: to explain why economic agents might care about human rights 
practices; to explain why governments would be willing to interfere with private 
investment decisions that do not involve serious national interests, and to explain 
why either public or private actors would take a tactical concession seriously. 
Political economists have put forward the idea that certain human rights policies 
that we may think of as tactical serve as a signal of a government’s willingness to 
accept principles limits on its exercise of power. A government willing to com-
mit to respect human rights is also likely to respect property rights, the argu-
ment goes (Farber   2002  ; Moore   2003  ). Th   ere is some evidence that suggests that 
countries with less repressive rights practices tend to attract more foreign capital 
(Blanton and Blanton  2007 ), but surely this is only the case when rights are a part 
of a deep commitment to stable institutions, transparency in governance and the 
rule of law. If one could achieve all of the above and yet cut costs by repressing 
labor, it is not likely that traders or investors would mind all that much.   4     
  As a global matter, however, the evidence for rewarding tactical concessions 
appears weak. Despite claims that governments ratify treaties, for example, for 
tangible economic benefi  ts such as aid, trade or investment (Hathaway   2004  ; 
Hawkins and Goodliff  e   2006  ), researchers have found relatively little empirical 
evidence that any of these increase signifi  cantly when governments ratify major 
human rights treaties (Nielsen and Simmons   2009  ). While much more work 
should be done on how international and domestic actors respond to a range of 
tactical concessions, the evidence to date hardly suggests that actors are satisfi  ed 
with and thus reward in any material way these mere gestures. And why should 
  4          New research suggests that there may indeed be competitive pressures generated through 
trade with countries with high labor standards. If fi  rm X wants to sell its goods in high labor 
standard Country A they will be pressured to improve labor practices at home and in third 
countries where they produce their goods. As a result, countries tend to adopt labor prac-
tices that are similar to the countries to which they export. See for example Greenhill   et al.  
(2009).  
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they? Only an irrational or uninformed actor would reward a government for an 
insincere policy concession (Goodman and Jinks  2004 ).   
   Th   ere remains the possibility – the one most theoretically central to the case 
that PoHR wishes to make about socialization – that tactical concessions are 
expected and believed to be appropriate measures given the growing signifi  -
cance of external norms, the increasing domestic hopes for rights recognition, 
and the density of transnational connections that link the two. PoHR makes fre-
quent appeals to the concept of “world time” – the global social context in which 
communicative action takes place. Some quantitative research supports the 
idea that tactical human rights concessions respond at least in part to the global 
social context. Sociologists have gathered evidence that the ratifi  cation of some 
human rights treaties (the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, for example) is associated with major global socializing events 
that promote rights, such as international conferences and meetings. Th  ey  also 
adduce evidence that the more states are “embedded” in international institu-
tions, the more likely they are to ratify international human rights agreements 
(Wotipka and Ramirez   2008  ). Similar evidence about the importance of inter-
national socializing events has been advanced for what may be the “tactical” 
adoption of national human rights institutions (Koo and Ramirez   2009  ). Th  ese 
could be the kinds of persuasive opportunities that PoHR believes encourage 
states to take at least small steps toward addressing the abuses exposed by their 
critics. 
 Th   e quantitative evidence overall suggests that there are both internal and 
external infl  uences on tactical treaty ratifi  cation.     While concessions in some 
areas, such as women’s rights, seem to be closely connected with all-out social-
ization eff  orts by the international community, in other areas, such as torture 
and civil and political rights, external pressures may exist but governments 
have to be exceptionally attuned to the domestic political situation. Th  e  quan-
titative evidence linking ratifi  cation of the torture convention to the existence 
of opposition political parties in repressive regimes supplies some support for 
the making of tactical concessions, as described in the spiral model (Vreeland 
  2008  ). So too does the fi  nding that non-democracies with poor human rights 
records are more likely to ratify the torture convention than are democracies 
with poor human rights records (Hathaway   2007  ) – the former do not foresee 
the real probability of enforcement, at least in the short run    .     Th  e  fi  nding that 
ratifi  cation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights tends 
to be later rather than earlier in the term of a repressive government (Simmons 
  2009  ) suggests that short time horizons may have something to do with these 
choices. Most quantitative researchers are likely to agree with PoHR that   some  
governments make   some   tactical concessions.    5      Th   ere is disagreement on   why  
  5              Note, however, that many quantitative as well as qualitative studies suggest that the same 
“concessions” are not always tactical across countries. One of the strongest predictors of 
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(internal dynamics versus external material or social pressures; socialization 
versus cynical calculations). But on this point PoHR was ambiguous as well. 
Suffi   ce it to say that infl  uences “from above” as well as “from below” have been at 
work in various regions of the world, at diff  erent points in time, and with respect 
to diff  erent aspects of the international human rights regime, to create a certain 
number of tactical concessions to rights norms. Th   e central issue is: do these 
concessions matter for the practice of human rights around the world?        
    Th   e consequences of tactical concessions 
 Th   e central contribution of PoHR was the idea that even small concessions to 
rights principles had potentially powerful impacts. International human rights 
norms were seen as so powerful, that action or even talk meant simply to appease 
domestic critics or external peers or transnational “norm entrepreneurs” could 
actually unleash political and social forces that governments did not expect 
to face when the concession was made. Moreover, as discussed above, PoHR 
thought that speech acts which might initially have been primarily tactical even-
tually convince governments themselves that certain rights are desirable and 
appropriate behavior. Th   is combination of infl  uences, PoHR proposed, could 
improve the chances that human rights would be respected by that state. 
 One  diffi   culty of testing this argument empirically is that it is hard to prove 
defi  nitively which concessions to human rights are tactical and which are genu-
ine. If qualitative researchers have had some diffi   culty establishing exactly why 
governments make minor adjustments to their rights policies, quantitative 
researchers working with global data have an even more diffi   cult time. It is diffi   -
cult to establish with any precision exactly which moves are “tactical.”     Another 
reason for this gap in the spiral model’s DNA is that empirical researchers have 
tended to skip phase 4 of the spiral model (“prescriptive status”) in their impa-
tience to get right to the punch line: behavioral change.     But this means that a 
central claim of the spiral model has gone completely untested: no one has dem-
onstrated the link between tactical concessions and the increased propensity for 
governments to actually begin to “talk the talk.” 
  Testing this central claim would require a kind of quantitative research that 
so far has been rare in the literature surveyed in this chapter: actual textual ana-
lysis of a relevant corpus of government statements, press releases, documents, 
the ratifi  cation of human rights treaties is the democratic nature of the regime, which is 
consistent with an argument that countries are sincere ratifi  ers of these treaties (for the 
most part Simmons   2009  ). Ratifi  cation to lock in democratic gains in recently transitioned 
democracies is also a variation on sincere ratifi  cation (Moravcsik   2000  ). Sometimes there 
is genuine persuasion: “states are likely to be persuaded by arguments that draw on wide-
spread taken-for-granted norms, in particular, prohibitions on bodily harm, the importance 
of precedent in decision making, and the link between cooperation and progress” (Hawkins 
 2004 ). See also Goodliff   e and Hawkins ( 2006 ).    
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speeches and debates that would demonstrate a change in the language gov-
ernments use when discussing policies related to rights practices. PoHR should 
expect (but to my knowledge no researchers have produced) evidence that the 
quality as well as the quantity of references to human rights increases over time 
once tactical concessions have been made. In fact, if the spiral model has some 
purchase on reality, it should be possible to produce statistical evidence of a 
growing correlation between indicators of the activation of domestic groups 
and the incidence of increasingly compelling “speech acts” as refl  ected in offi   cial 
documents such as those listed above. Better still, it should be possible to fi  nd 
a correlation between these speech acts and rights improvements (with some 
lag). Such an analysis would bolster the claim of the importance of consistently 
acknowledging the legitimacy of international human rights norms on actual 
outcomes. It would provide critical evidence about the importance of rhetorical 
entrapment in explaining eventual rule-consistent behavior.   
   Th   e most studied “tactical concession,” as discussed above, has been the ratifi  -
cation of international treaties, although it is quite clear that most governments 
are sincere when they ratify (or sincerely refrain from doing so), while only a 
fraction appear to ratify without any intention to signifi  cantly change rights 
practices.  6     Other less studied but possible tactical concessions might include 
institutional changes, such as the creation of national human rights institutions, 
the release of political prisoners, or the use of trials to prosecute egregious indi-
vidual rights abusers. Very little research has been done on the eff  ects of tactical 
concessions, outside of treaty ratifi  cation.    7     And it is standard to skip any atten-
tion to rhetoric, and jump straight to the behavioral outcomes – dependent vari-
ables indicative of improved rights practices. Th   e modal research of the 2000s 
looks directly for correlations between treaty ratifi  cation and improvements in 
rights behavior, not pausing for a moment to examine and attempt to verify the 
claims for the power of argumentation advanced by PoHR. 
 Th  e  fi  ndings of researchers who have examined this relationship between tac-
tical concessions and actual improvements in human rights practice have been 
all over the map. Th   is is true even though they use very similar data and related 
methodologies. Th   e big diff  erence is in how they choose to set expectations, the 
conditions (of lack thereof) they place on their arguments, and how exactly they 
measure outcomes. Th  e  fi  rst generation of quantitative research took a homo-
genous approach to treaty ratifi  cation. All states were assumed to be alike – or 
suffi   ciently similar – such that the early quantitative researchers saw no need to 
develop conditional arguments about how they thought ratifi  cation might work 
  6          Another relatively small set of countries maintain or improve their rights practices, but do 
not ratify international treaties, which raises another set of puzzles dealt with elsewhere 
(Simmons  2009 ).  
  7      Th   e quantitative research on national human rights institutions focuses primarily on their 
creation and not, thus far, on their eff  ects. See for example Koo and Ramirez ( 2009 ).  
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in various contexts. “Country-years” were simply pooled in a big regression, 
from which researchers tried to draw general inferences.   Proceeding in this way, 
Linda Camp-Keith found no statistically signifi  cant impact to ratifi  cation of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on Freedom 
House’s measure of civil and political rights, or Gibney and Stohl’s personal integ-
rity index (Keith  1999 )  .   Oona Hathaway found no positive impact to ratifi  cation 
of the Convention Against Torture (CAT) on her carefully constructed torture 
scale when pooling all states unconditionally into a single regression (Hathaway 
  2002  )    .     Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui regressed the total number 
of major human rights treaties ratifi  ed on the political terror scale and found 
no relationship, again across all countries (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui   2005  )    . 
All of these scholars concluded that the ratifi  cation of human rights treaties 
did not matter. In fact, they argued that, in sharp contrast to the spiral model, 
such a tactical concession could even be deleterious. Ratifi  cation would   satisfy  
critics,   defl  ect   criticism,   legitimate   repressive regimes, and allow them to con-
tinue or maybe even to worsen their repressive practices (Hafner-Burton   et 
al.     2008  ; Hathaway   2002  ). Many concluded there was a growing “compliance 
gap,” although exactly what this meant in practice was somewhat unclear (see 
 Chapter 5 , this volume).   
  Why might these fi  ndings appear to be so pessimistic? It might very well 
be that this fi  rst generation of researchers was not specifi  c enough about the 
conditions under which they expected the ratifi  cation of treaties to matter for 
rights practices. Th   ey may not have completely thought through the political 
and social mechanisms that would link a tactical concession such as treaty rati-
fi  cation to the possibility of an improved rights outcome.     If they had, would 
they not have seen the obvious explanatory limits that the ratifi  cation of the 
Convention Against Torture would have in Norway, a country with a perfect 
score on Hathaway’s scale for the history of the index?         Did they realistically 
expect North Korea’s 1981 ratifi  cation of the ICCPR    8     to matter much in that 
country?   
  It is critical to understand, as PoHR clarifi  ed in their description of the spiral 
model, that tactical concessions   alone   do not improve the practice of human 
rights. Treaties are legal agreements written down on pieces of paper (or posted 
on the Internet) and they don’t have arms, legs, brains or iPhones. Th  ey  can’t 
  do   anything. Th   ey must be used by purposive agents that have the motivation 
to leverage them to achieve their goals. Releasing a few political prisoners does 
not fundamentally improve rights, unless people are encouraged to demand 
broader changes in civil and political rights. Setting up national institutions can 
be a meaningless isomorphism unless bureaus have a certain degree of inde-
pendence and suffi   cient resources to get started on serious work.   
  8      See  www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratifi  cation-korea.html  (accessed June 1, 2010).  
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      As PoHR was careful to spell out, non-governmental actors residing locally 
and also operating transnationally have an essential role to play in pressuring 
and persuading a government to follow up their symbolic gestures with real 
action. It does not make sense to argue that non-governmental organizations 
are “more important” than ratifi  cation, trials, institutions or the release of pris-
oners. Civil society, especially domestic actors with a huge and ongoing stake in 
the outcome, use these tactical moves to focus their eff  orts, build political sup-
port, legitimate their demands for human rights. 
      One insight of PoHR’s spiral model was that under specifi  c circumstances 
tactical concessions would culminate with what they termed “prescriptive sta-
tus” or better yet “rule-consistent behavior.” Th   is was only likely where domestic 
civil society could become activated: “ Only when and if  the domestic opposition 
fully mobilizes and supplements the pressure ‘from above’ by pressure ‘from 
below’ can the transition toward prescriptive status and sustained improvement 
of human rights conditions be achieved” (PoHR: 34; emphasis added). PoHR 
was not very specifi  c about the conditions under which it expected such mobil-
ization to take place, but one approach is to think in terms of the expected value 
of mobilization. People will not mobilize when they do not expect much of a 
pay-off   from doing so; aft  er all mobilization against the government in many 
cases is costly and even dangerous. We can think of the   expected value of mobil-
ization   as the product of two factors: the   value   people put on succeeding in 
achieving their goals and the   likelihood   of success. In other words, in order to 
really mobilize, people need a   motive   to organize and a   means   through which 
they might be able to infl  uence their government to change its practices. In 
highly repressive regimes, the value placed on succeeding in securing a right 
is extremely high. It is a huge improvement in rights well-being to be free from 
arbitrary arrest for political reasons, and to be guaranteed reasonably humane 
treatment while in government custody. In highly repressive regimes, people 
are highly motivated to organize to seize on a tactical concession to call for even 
more concessions and to publicize the principles to which the government has 
rendered lip-service. Th   e only problem is that they are likely to pay an extremely 
high price. Highly repressive regimes are likely to meet such demands by crush-
ing them and making life very diffi   cult for the leaders of the mobilization. 
 In other cases, governments can be expected to be relatively responsive to the 
demands of political opponents. In fact they may have such a long history of 
such responsiveness that there is very little “rights space” that the public does not 
freely and regularly enjoy. In these cases, people have the means to eff  ectively put 
demands to the government, but they are not nearly so motivated. And because 
social mobilization and political organization require eff  ort, few will have the 
motivation to organize to work for even better rights, which they experience as 
having diminishing marginal utility. So whereas the fi  rst few rights are extraor-
dinarily highly valued, the 99th might not be worth taking to the streets.     When 
allegations of torture were revealed at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, for example, 
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they scarcely became part of the national electoral debate in 2004; Americans 
generally were content that in most cases their rights were well-protected and 
were not politically mobilized on this issue. Th   is was an instance in which people 
had the means, but not especially the motivation, to demand compliance with 
the Torture Convention.     
 Th   ought of in terms of the expected value of mobilization, then, we should 
expect pressure “from below” in countries ruled by neither stable, repressive 
autocracies (where people are deterred from mobilizing for fear of getting 
crushed) nor in stable democracies (where decades of responsive government 
has supplied already a full range of rights – hence the motive to organize is 
weak). Tactical concessions should be expected to have their most profound 
impact where people anticipate they have some chance of successfully realiz-
ing their demands at reasonable cost. Th   is implies that the spiral is most likely 
to work its way to a positive conclusion in neither stable autocracies (where 
domestic groups risk being crushed), nor stable democracies (where phase 1 
repression is extraordinarily rare to begin with), but rather in countries that are 
transitioning to, backsliding from, or in a state of partial democracy (Simmons 
  2009  ). It is in those cases in which the pressure “from below” is most likely to 
become activated. 
   Th  e quantitative research is now beginning to refl  ect this and other more 
conditional arguments about the relationship between tactical concessions and 
improved rights. Recent research is beginning to demonstrate for example that 
treaty ratifi  cation in countries whose regimes are in fl  ux (neither stable autoc-
racies nor stable democracies) does indeed have some important infl  uence on 
rights practices. “Transition countries” that have ratifi  ed the CAT are much 
more likely to make improvements along Oona Hathaway’s torture scale than 
are transition countries that have not ratifi  ed the CAT. “Transition countries” 
that have ratifi  ed the ICCPR are more likely to provide fair trials, and are more 
likely to respect freedom of religion than are those transition countries that have 
not ratifi  ed. And in all of these cases, the positive consequences of ratifi  cation 
are concentrated in this category of countries; no eff  ect could be found in either 
stable democracies or stable autocracies,  which is consistent with the spiral model 
and what might have been expected from the outset  . Tactical concessions matter 
tremendously, but only where domestic groups have the motive and the means 
to demand more meaningful change.   
  Recent quantitative work increasingly suggests that various other kinds of 
tactical concessions have a conditional impact on broader human rights prac-
tices.     For example,   Chapter 7   in this volume demonstrates that once a treaty 
has been ratifi  ed by a country subsequently investigated for widespread human 
rights abuses by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, human rights 
performance improves.    
      Another example of the importance of conditionality in explaining patterns 
of change relates to the presence or absence of trials for human rights violations. 
9781107028937c03_p43-60.indd   56 9781107028937c03_p43-60.indd   56 10/29/2012   11:34:15 PM 10/29/2012   11:34:15 PMFrom ratification to compliance 57
In some cases, human rights trials might qualify as a “tactical concession.” 
Certainly, it is not obvious that a few trials will lead to any fundamental changes 
in human rights practices. New research suggests that  at least in transition coun-
tries  , such trials have had important rights consequences generally.     Hunjoon 
Kim and Kathryn Sikkink argue that human rights trials work to some extent 
through their ability to deter future abuses, by reducing the probability that the 
crime will go unpunished (Kim and Sikkink  2007 )  . 
  While Kim and Sikkink emphasize the deterrent eff  ect of criminal trials, 
their work complements a large literature on the additional leverage litigation 
(whether successful or not) can give to broader social rights movements. “Cause 
lawyering” (Ellmann   1998  ) describes the strategic use of legal resources, such 
as treaties, constitutional provisions and the local penal code, to bolster claims 
in local courts that governments or in the case of torture specifi  c government 
offi   cials have broken the law by which they are bound.   
 Th  e quantitative scholarship does reveal conditional but strong conse-
quences that result from government actions that might correctly be termed 
“tactical.” Th   e strongest fi  ndings are consistent with the idea that mobiliza-
tion of domestic groups and the establishment and strengthening of the rule 
of law contribute to positive outcomes. Much more quantitative work could 
be done to explore the conditions under which strategic prisoner releases 
or the establishment of national human rights institutions or even constitu-
tional innovations to incorporate rights might contribute to longer run rights 
improvements, but the data collection eff  orts are signifi  cant and research is 
just  getting  underway.         
  Conclusions 
   Th   e pathway from commitment to compliance with international human rights 
norms has been highly varied across time and space. It has also been quite con-
tingent, and fraught with setbacks as well as noteworthy successes. Almost 
every study of this pathway has emphasized the ways in which purposive actors 
have used international human rights norms to persuade, cajole, pressure and 
shame governments to live up to the commitments they have made to respect 
the rights of their own people. Th   e spiral model was a succinct description of an 
ideal type of progression from commitment to compliance with human rights 
norms. Only a weak logic connected the stages of the model; the fulfi  llment of 
one stage presented the possibility – hardly the inevitability – of movement to 
the “next” stage. More than a decade of research has now accumulated to under-
line at least one conclusion: tactical concessions oft  en have important human 
rights consequences. At least where agents with the motive and the means to 
organize domestically and transnationally, and where organizational pressures 
can be sustained, commitments have been associated with better human rights 
outcomes than one might have anticipated in their absence. 
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   PoHR got at an essential truth – emboldening individuals and groups to view 
themselves as rights holders “triggers” a new politics based on altered expecta-
tions and new political alliances. Not everywhere and at all times; in fact, one 
weakness of the spiral model was its imprecision on scope conditions. PoHR 
perhaps was not clear enough on this issue in trying to explain why so many 
countries seem to get stuck at the point of making tactical concessions without 
ever coming close to rule-consistent behavior. Subsequent quantitative research 
suggests that one important scope condition is enough of a liberalizing open-
ing to make domestic mobilization possible. Tactical commitments – especially 
legal ones like treaty ratifi  cation – also are likely to have much more traction 
where independent foci of authority (e.g. the courts) can independently sup-
port rights claims vis-  à  -vis the government. At the same time, some studies 
discussed above have supported the notion that external sources of material 
pressure, social shaming and group enforcement push the spiral along. 
  But it is hardly the case that methodological diff  erences have dictated the 
answers to the question about what drive compliance with international human 
rights norms.   Emilie Hafner-Burton and James Ron have written, provocatively, 
that “to date, assessments of eff  orts at protecting human rights have been shaped 
in large part by choice of research method” (Hafner-Burton and Ron   2009  ). 
Th   ey develop a detailed argument as to why qualitative researchers have been 
optimists, while quantitative researchers have come to much more pessimistic 
fi   ndings.   
  Why these fi  ndings should vary by research methodology is not quite clear, 
but in any case there is scarcely any systematic variance to explain between the 
fi  ndings of qualitative and quantitative researchers. As their own article notes, 
fi  ndings generally converge when investigators agree upon scope conditions.    9   
No researcher – quantitative or qualitative – has advanced the argument that 
international norms to treaties have a radical eff  ect on human rights in coun-
tries where domestic opposition is immediately and brutally put down, just as 
no researcher of any methodological persuasion has argued that international 
norms and treaties operate independently of purposive actors and domestic or 
transnational politics. Th   e most interesting research to date has been precisely 
on the specifi  cation of the mechanisms linking domestic and transnational pol-
itics, and using multiple methods to elucidate these connections (see  Chapter 5 , 
this volume). 
  9      Compare Hafner-Burton and Ron ( 2009 : 368 and 371). First, somewhat cautious qualitative 
fi  ndings are attributed to scope conditions: “many qualitative studies noted important  scope 
conditions   for their claims, and many explicitly recognized that human rights progress is 
oft  en partial … not inevitable” (p. 368); three pages later, somewhat optimistic quantitative 
fi  ndings are attributed to scope conditions as well: “Second-generation statistical research-
ers have discovered some good news but attribute most of it to particular   scope conditions  
and domestic factors” (p. 371).  
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 Th   is is not to say a good deal more could not be done in this regard. As quan-
titative researchers move away from their obsession with global trends, more 
quantitative data on more detailed domestic mechanisms can be collected 
within smaller groups of countries or regions. Th   e research to date has been 
dominated by a few crucial human rights, such as repression, civil rights, tor-
ture and physical integrity. Th   ese are of central importance, but there is almost 
as much to be gained by comparing whether and how international norms such 
as the death penalty, women’s rights and children’s rights also impact local prac-
tices. And as PoHR’s original volume stresses, there are many possible kinds of 
tactical concessions that could be explored. While current research has focused 
on treaty ratifi  cation, it would also be useful to fi  nd out if other kinds of tactical 
responses – from the release of prisoners to the payment of compensation to 
victims – have the eff  ect of stimulating more demands and ever higher expecta-
tions from domestic and transnational audiences. 
      Finally, there is much to do quantitatively on the new research agenda that 
Th   omas Risse and Stephen Ropp set out in the introductory chapter of this vol-
ume.    Th   e conditions under which non-governmental actors comply with inter-
national human rights norms remains hugely understudied by quantitative 
researchers (but see Greenhill   et al.    2009 ).  Th   is is of course partly an artifact 
of the way data have been collected for decades: by and about   states .  Several 
of the contributions to this volume point to progress on moving away from an 
exclusive focus on   state   compliance. Firms are increasingly crucial actors both 
in terms of their direct impact on human rights as well as their status as civil 
society actors that can support or oppose demands for rights protections (see 
Chapters by 11, 12 and 13, this volume). Th   e problems associated with sam-
pling cases and collecting data on such varied, secretive and ephemeral entities 
as fi  rms in an unbiased way is truly daunting. But until more work can be done 
to disaggregate the nature of the political actors with important infl  uences over 
human rights outcomes, we will be missing a signifi  cant part of the dynamics 
that explain or impede the move from accepting principles to changing actual 
rights practices.      
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